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Abstract 
Perspective-taking interventions have been shown to improve attitudes toward social 
outgroups. In contrast, similar interventions have produced opposite effects (i.e., enhanced 
negativity) in the context of attitudes to elderly groups. The current study investigated 
whether a brief perspective-taking intervention enhanced with mindfulness would be 
associated with less negativity than perspective-taking alone. One hundred and five 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions which comprised of an active 
or control perspective-taking component and an active or control mindfulness component. 
Participants were then administered an Implicit Associated Test to assess implicit biases 
toward the elderly. Results supported previous findings in that the condition in which 
perspective-taking was active but mindfulness was inactive was associated with greater 
negative implicit bias toward the elderly, however, some of this negativity decreased in the 
active perspective-taking and active mindfulness condition. The current findings and other 
mixed effects that have emerged from perspective-taking interventions are discussed from a 
Relational Frame Theory perspective. 
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The ability to take the perspective of another person has long been considered a critical fea-
ture of human psychology (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Parker & Axtell, 2001). Earliest 
accounts of perspective-taking date back as far as Piaget (1932), who suggested that this abil-
ity was a fundamental developmental milestone of cognitive functioning. Kohlberg (1976) 
subsequently suggested that perspective-taking is particularly foundational in moral reason-
ing. More recent academic interests in the concept of perspective-taking have focused on the 
putative role of these skills in social biases. For example, interventions based on improving 
an outsider’s view of a different social group appear to reduce both implicit and explicit prej-
udice (Batson et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Mos-
kowitz, 2000), even in the context of race (Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003).  
Most studies that have employed perspective-taking interventions to influence social 
attitudes have relied almost exclusively on explicit self-report measures, which remain poten-
tially sensitive to extraneous sources of influence (e.g., self-presentation). More recently, 
however, there has been an increasing interest in the use of latency-based measures to study 
social attitudes at the implicit level. The most common of these measures is known as the Im-
plicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The basic principle of the measure 
suggests that participants should be faster when pairing two closely related than weakly re-
lated categories. While the body of evidence using, and supporting the IAT is now extensive, 
only a handful of studies have investigated the effects of perspective-taking on implicit atti-
tudes. Of the existing published work, Todd and colleagues (2011, 2012) used a Race IAT 
and reported that greater positive implicit attitudes were associated with a racial outgroup fol-
lowing a brief perspective-taking intervention. Conversely, Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) 
found that a similar intervention was associated with more negative attitudes toward the el-
derly, compared with a control intervention. These mixed findings suggest that differential 
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outcomes are associated with perspective-taking interventions when used to alter attitudes to-
ward different groups.   
A number of psychological theories may assist in the interpretation of the different 
attitudes recorded after perspective-taking interventions across different groups. For instance, 
some social psychology theorists argue that self-other associations emerge in tandem with 
perspective-taking and facilitate favorable responses towards outgroups (Cadinu & Rothbart, 
1996; Smith & Henry, 1996). That is, perspective-taking enhances an individual’s ability to 
appreciate the views of the outgroup and thus reduces the perception of differences and 
negative bias, and increases positive bias. This view finds considerable support in the 
perspective-taking intervention outcomes reported by Todd et al. (2011, 2012), at least in the 
context of racial bias. However, this account fails to explain the negative bias towards elderly 
groups after a perspective-taking intervention, as reported by Skorinko and Sinclair (2013). 
Some behavioral psychology theorists appear to offer a more comprehensive account of the 
potential relationship between perspective-taking and social bias, using basic tenets from a 
behavioral theory of language and cognition, known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
According to RFT, language is relational and the different patterns of relational 
responding that have been identified include: coordination, comparison, opposition, 
distinction, causality, hierarchy, and perspective-taking. For RFT, perspective-taking 
specifically involves interpersonal relations (I vs. YOU), spatial relations (HERE vs. 
THERE), and temporal relations (NOW vs. THEN, see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Cullinan, 2001). However, perspective-taking relations participate in relational networks with 
the many other types of relations in the on-going development of self. For example, “you are 
taller than me” involves the interpersonal relations and a comparison relation, while “my 
sister and I are very alike, but different from our mother” also involves interpersonal relations 
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but now in conjunction with a coordination relation (specified by “alike”) and a distinction 
relation (specified by “different from”). RFT, therefore, appears to offer an account of 
perspective-taking that permits considerable complexity in terms of the relations between I 
and you, and thus potentially in the variable patterns between in-groups and outgroups.  
According to RFT, therefore, any number of relations can operate in conjunction with 
the interpersonal relations I and YOU. For example, some ‘others’ will be coordinated with 
me because they are in my in-group, while some ‘others’ will be distinct from me because 
they are not in my in-group, hence in an outgroup. There may be different bases for these 
relational responses. In the case of gender, for instance, a white female might more readily 
coordinate I and YOU (other females) based on gender, but distinguish herself from white 
males. In this case, gender forms the basis for the coordination relation between this white 
woman and all other women (irrespective of race), but also forms the basis of the distinction 
relation with all men (even white men). Conversely, the same white female might more 
readily coordinate I and YOU (other white people) based on race, but distinguish herself from 
non-white people. In this case, race forms the basis for the coordination relation between this 
white woman and all other white people (irrespective of gender), but also forms the basis of 
the distinction relation with all non-white people (even other women).   
Now consider a similar example of the interpersonal perspective-taking relations 
operating with other relations based on age. If I am young, I am likely to participate in a 
comparison relation with older people (i.e., they are older than me) based on age. Now also 
consider the psychological and evaluative functions that are likely attached to I and YOU, 
such as youth being positively evaluated and old age being negatively evaluated. In this case, 
if I respond to “she is many years older than me”, there is not only the comparison relation 
based on age, but this brings to bear the relative evaluations in which she will now be 
evaluated more negatively than me. For instance, if you are much older than me and age is 
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bad, you are much worse than I am. For RFT, therefore, interpersonal relations interact with 
many other types of relations and the functions of the related events transfer or transform 
accordingly.  
For perspective-taking interventions to work, they should enhance the extent to which 
I can see the world as others see it, at least in some respects. In many contexts, this would 
render an individual more positive toward the perspective of others being adopted. For 
example, if a young person is presented with such an exercise, she might be asked to walk 
around for a short time with a limp to appreciate how difficult it is to walk when your limbs 
are aged and infirm. For RFT, this would enhance the coordination between I and YOU 
regarding age and would likely transform some negative evaluative functions (e.g., slowness) 
that were based on the previous distinction or comparison relation to empathic functions (e.g., 
suffering). Consider now, however, how transforming additional functions may indeed make 
attitudes more negative, rather than more positive. For example, if the young person in this 
case recently recovered from a brief but difficult illness, coordinating her now with illness 
could have highly aversive functions (i.e., age is coordinated with sickness, sickness is bad, 
coordinating age with me is aversive). In this case, negative functions transform through the 
coordination of perspectives between I and the elderly. Given the increasing research interest 
in using RFT to understand human psychological processes, and how this translates into 
clinical practice, we may be able to draw upon this literature to further explore the mixed 
outcomes from the use of perspective-taking interventions in altering attitudes to the elderly.  
Relational Frame Theory has similarly been used to account for clinical changes 
associated with mindfulness, including very brief interventions (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; 
McHugh, Simpson, & Reed, 2010). According to Kabat-Zinn (2003), mindfulness can be 
defined as “paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” 
(p.145). In RFT terms, Foody, Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes (2012) suggested that 
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attending to the present moment (i.e., mindfulness) is functionally equivalent to responding to 
stimuli under the control of the HERE-NOW and not THERE-THEN. It appears, therefore, 
that mindfulness also involves the perspective-taking frames, but responding is primarily 
focused on I rather than others. In perspective-taking, on the other hand, responding requires 
behaving with regard to both I and others.  
Given their focus on I, mindfulness exercises are typically used to bring an individual 
into appetitive contact with her own psychological content, especially that which is painful 
and has been avoided previously. If, as suggested above, negative attitudes to the elderly 
emerge through a coordination relation between I and elderly, perhaps because of the 
transformation of emotionally aversive functions, then in principle a mindfulness-based 
intervention could be used to alter the avoidance functions of related painful emotions, such 
that they would no longer transfer from I to elderly. On the other hand, a perspective-taking 
intervention that facilitates adopting the perspective of the elderly, but lacks mindfulness that 
would potentially reduce or defuse the aversive functions, may be associated with negative 
attitudes, as observed previously.    
In order to investigate the potentially differential outcomes of mindfulness versus per-
spective-taking without mindfulness on implicit attitudes to the elderly, the current study 
sought to extend the research by Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) using the IAT. We systemati-
cally compared perspective-taking (i.e., taking the perspective of an elderly person)  
and mindfulness (i.e., brief focused attention on breathing) by including both components in 
each intervention, but altering whether each of the two components (perspective-taking or 
mindfulness) was active or passive. We also compared these interventions with a control con-
dition, containing both components, but in inactive form. After their designated intervention, 
each participant completed an Elderly IAT to assess their implicit attitudes to the elderly. 
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Based on existing literature and the suggestions above, we predicted that the active perspec-
tive-taking+active mindfulness intervention would be associated with less negativity than ac-
tive perspective-taking+control mindfulness. As above, the assumption here was that the per-
spective-taking exercise would transform negative functions by coordinating I with elderly 
and coordinating elderly with negative, but that the mindfulness intervention could in princi-
ple serve to reduce these negative functions, thus being associated with relatively weaker 
negative attitudes to the elderly. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and five undergraduates were recruited in exchange for course credit. 
The mean age was 21.75 (SD 1.23), with 49 males and 56 females. The distribution of males 
and females in each of the four conditions was approximately equal (≤+/-4). Two participants 
were removed from the analyses based on their IAT data (i.e., 10% of their trials had response 
latencies <300 ms). 
Materials  
The IAT. The IAT is a computer-based test that assesses reaction time biases 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The Elderly IAT employed here was standardized 
(see Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002, for a review). That is, participants were provided 
with seven categorization tasks, using the same age-based stimuli as Turner and Crisp (2010). 
The tasks involved categorizing valenced target words with sample words (e.g., ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’). For example, in one task, participants were asked to categorize typical young 
names (e.g., Brad, Zack, Lucy, etc.) and typical old names (e.g., Cyril, Arthur, Mildred, etc.) 
with positive (e.g., ‘smile’ and ‘paradise’) and negative sample stimuli (e.g., ‘slime’ and 
‘pain’). The rationale of the IAT predicts that participants with a positive bias towards young 
people will more readily associate a young person’s name with ‘positive’ (than ‘negative’), 
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while participants with a negative bias towards old people will more readily associate an 
older person’s name with ‘negative’ than ‘positive’.  
Interventions. All four conditions in the current study presented an intervention that 
contained a perspective-taking component, followed by a mindfulness component. However, 
each component had an active or passive/control version (i.e., active versus control 
perspective-taking and active versus control mindfulness). This generated four conditions 
referred to as follows: active perspective-taking+active mindfulness (P+M, N=28); active 
perspective-taking+control mindfulness (P+cM, N=32); control perspective-taking+active 
mindfulness (cP+M, N=20); and control perspective-taking+control mindfulness (cP+cM, 
N=20). It is important to note that the condition denoted as cP+cM was employed as a control 
condition, such that participants here were exposed to an intervention that matched the others, 
but in this case both components were inactive. 
The active perspective-taking task (P). The elderly perspective-taking task employed 
here was identical to Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000). That is, participants were presented 
with an image of an elderly person in a neutral setting (e.g., not in a hospital bed). They were 
then asked to write a short narrative about a day in the life of the elderly person in the picture, 
from the first person’s perspective. The instructions were: “Shortly you will be presented with 
a picture of an individual. You will be given 5 minutes to write a short narrative about a 
typical day in the life of the individual in the picture.” This task was rendered active 
perspective-taking by inclusion of the following instruction: “When writing your narrative, 
please try to imagine a day in the life of this individual as if you were that person, looking at 
the world through his eyes and walking through the world in his shoes.” 
 The control perspective-taking task (cP). The control perspective-taking task was 
also identical to Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), except that the narrative was not to be 
written from the first person’s perspective and thus the final sentence of the instruction was 
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excluded.  
The active mindfulness task (M). The mindfulness task was largely identical to 
McHugh et al. (2010). The task involved listening to a 9-minute voice recording outlining 
mindfulness techniques, as follows: “Now we’re going to do an exercise for 9 minutes. First, 
settle into a comfortable sitting position. This is an exercise to increase your mindfulness of 
the present moment so that you can clear away any thoughts about past and future events. 
Start by focusing on your breathing. Don’t try to change anything about your breathing, just 
notice the air moving in and out of your body. Try to focus all your attention on your 
breathing. Notice the sensation of breathing air in. Notice the sensation of breathing air out. 
As you breathe air into your body, fill your mind with the thought ‘just this one breath’. As 
you breathe air out of your body, fill your mind with the thought ‘just this one exhale’. Focus 
on the actual sensation of breath entering and leaving your body. Just this one breath in. Just 
this one exhale out. If you notice that your awareness is no longer on your breath gently bring 
your awareness back. Just this one breath. Just this one exhale. Continue focusing only on 
each breath in and each breath out, do not anticipate anything, even your next breath. Only 
focus on one breath at a time. If anything else pops into your mind, push it aside and refocus 
your attention to each breath. Continue focusing on each breath in and each exhale out until 
you hear the sound of the bell.” These instructions lasted nine minutes because of sizeable 
pauses between sentences to give participants time to engage in the specified activity. What 
made this intervention active mindfulness is that participants were instructed to focus 
specifically on noticing their own breathing. 
The control mindfulness task (cM). The control mindfulness task was also identical 
to McHugh et al. (2010), but the task was now rendered a control component by instructing 
participants to let their minds wander freely. The instructions were as follows: “Now we’re 
going to do an exercise for nine minutes. First, settle into a comfortable sitting position. 
9 
 
Simply think about whatever comes to mind. Let your mind wander freely without trying to 
focus on anything in particular. Let your mind wander until you hear the sound of the bell.” 
This task also lasted for nine minutes to control for the length of the active mindfulness 
component. 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the intervention (both components) prior to the IAT. 
The IAT. The IAT consisted of two instruction screens followed by seven blocks, 
each of which consisted of a number of trials. The pre-block instruction screens contained the 
following instructions: “For this portion of the study, words will appear one at a time in the 
middle of the screen. Classify those words into groups which will be designated with labels 
appearing on the top half of the screen. All words belonging to the groups on the left will be 
classified with the ‘e’ key. All words belonging to the groups on the right will be classified 
with the ‘i’ key. Classify the words as quickly as possible while making as few mistakes as 
possible. Accuracy and speed are both important. Pay close attention to the group labels, they 
will change from block to block. Direct any questions to the experimenter. For the next 
portion of this study, you will be asked to classify words into the categories of OLD and 
YOUNG as well as words related to POSITIVE and NEGATIVE. The words related to each 
of the categories are shown below. Remember, when the word in the center corresponds to 
the category on the left, you will use the ‘e’ key, and when the word in the center corresponds 
to the category on the right, you will use the ‘i’ key. Classify the words as quickly as possible 
while making as few mistakes as possible.” Before each block, the message “Check 
categories-Press space bar when ready” appeared at the bottom of the screen.  
A trial was defined as the time in milliseconds from the onset of a stimulus to the 
emission of a correct response. The stimulus categories (old, young, positive, negative) 
remained on the top left and top right of the screen throughout each block. Words relating to 
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positive and negative categories were presented in white, whereas words relating to old and 
young categories were presented in green. Each trial presented the to be categorized stimulus 
in the middle of the screen. Participants responded using the ‘e’ and ‘i’ keys. If an incorrect 
response was emitted, a red ‘X’ was displayed below the stimulus, and a correct response was 
required before proceeding to the next trial. After each trial, the stimulus in the middle of the 
screen was cleared for an intertrial interval of 250 ms. 
Results 
IAT Data. All IAT latency data were transformed into D scores using the standardized 
procedure described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). The D score reflects the 
latency difference for old-good/young-bad versus young-good/old-bad associations. In simple 
terms, this is the standardized difference between old-good blocks and young-good blocks, 
where a positive D score reflects this pro-old/anti-young bias and a negative D score reflects 
an anti-old/pro-young bias.  
The mean D scores and standard deviations for the four conditions are presented in 
Table 1. From the outset, four one sample t-tests conducted for each condition against 
baseline D scores of zero all yielded significance (all ps <0.001), thus showing strong D 
scores in all cases. However, the direction of these effects differed considerably across 
conditions. Specifically, both cP+cM and cP+M (i.e., control perspective-taking) showed a 
strong pro-old (positive) bias, while both P+cM and P+M (i.e., active perspective-taking) 
showed a strong anti-old (negative) bias. Hence, opposite effects were observed when the 
perspective-taking intervention was active (negative bias) or passive (positive bias). It was 
also interesting that there was a modest difference in the size of the negative bias between the 
conditions in which perspective-taking was active, but mindfulness was or was not active. 
That is, the active mindfulness component was associated with a weaker negative bias than 
control mindfulness (when each was paired with active perspective-taking).  
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A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted with IAT D score as the dependent variable and 
perspective-taking (i.e., active vs. control) and mindfulness  (i.e., active vs. control) as the 
2x2 factors. As expected, there was a significant main effect for perspective-taking (F(1) = 
151.132, 2p = 0.612, p < 0.01), but not mindfulness (p > 0.05), and the interaction effect 
between perspective-taking and mindfulness was not significant (p > 0.05). Furthermore, a 
univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) was then conducted with D scores as the 
dependent variable and condition as the factor and significant main effects were recorded for 
condition (F(1) = 53.323, 2p = 0.625, p < 0.01).  
---------------------------------------Table 1 Here--------------------------------- 
Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected t-tests thereafter showed a number of significant 
differences between conditions. P+cM differed significantly from all other conditions (all ps 
< 0.05). That is, the condition in which perspective-taking was active (negative bias) 
produced a significantly different D score than when perspective-taking was passive (positive 
bias in both cP+cM and cP+M). Furthermore, this condition (P+cM) was also associated with 
a significantly stronger negative bias than when the active perspective-taking component was 
combined with active mindfulness (i.e., P+M, mindfulness appeared to significantly reduce 
the negative bias). As expected from the D scores, the negative bias in P+M also differed 
significantly from the positive bias observed in both cP+cM and cP+M (both ps < 0.001, all 
other ps > 0.05). Overall, the statistical analyses supported our two predictions: active 
perspective-taking was associated with a strong negative bias (relative to inactive 
perspective-taking), and this negative bias was significantly reduced by active mindfulness 
(relative to inactive mindfulness). 
Discussion 
The present study explored the relationship between a combined perspective-
taking+mindfulness intervention and implicit biases toward the elderly, as measured by the 
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IAT. However, we systematically investigated the potentially different effects of each of the 
two intervention components (perspective-taking versus mindfulness) on the D scores. Based 
on findings reported by Skorinko and Sinclair (2013), we predicted that an active perspective-
taking component would be associated with a negative bias toward the elderly. While our data 
replicated this original effect, we also found that presenting an intervention with an inactive 
perspective-taking component (i.e., not emphasizing that participants fully adopt the 
perspective of an elderly person) produced a significantly different positive bias. This 
suggested, and our statistical analyses further supported this, that the negative bias was 
influenced by the active perspective-taking component.  
It is important to note that Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) employed a stereotypical 
image of an elderly person (i.e., in a hospital bed), whereas we employed a neutral image (an 
elderly person standing by a wall) in the perspective-taking component of the intervention. 
Yet, a strong negative bias toward the elderly was recorded in both studies. First, this gives 
greater confidence in the likelihood that this effect, in terms of the relationship between 
actually taking the perspective of an elderly person and implicit negative bias toward the 
elderly is robust. However, the overlap in the two effects recorded also undermines the 
possible argument our effects resulted simply from a negatively valenced picture of an elderly 
person. On the contrary, the picture employed here was neutral, while it was more 
stereotypically negative in the original study, and yet similar outcomes were recorded. 
Given positive defusion outcomes previously reported for mindfulness interventions, 
and in the context of reducing age-related bias, we made two further speculations (Lueke & 
Gibson, 2015; Masuda, Price, Anderson, Schmertz & Calamaras, 2009). First, we 
hypothesized that the negative bias associated with active perspective-taking toward the 
elderly may be accounted for by the transfer of negative functions when the perspective of an 
elderly person was coordinated with the perspective of I. Second, we speculated that if this 
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was the case, a mindfulness intervention may reduce this negative impact by facilitating some 
level of defusion regarding this psychological content. The difference between the strong 
negative bias toward the elderly when the mindfulness component was passive, compared 
with the significantly weaker negative bias when mindfulness was active, supported our 
hypothesis. In short, mindfulness appeared to ameliorate the negative bias, likely through 
defusing some of the negative functions that transfer to I when the perspective of I is 
coordinated with the perspective of an elderly person. 
The fact that our data supported both of our predictions, especially with regard to the 
ability of the mindfulness intervention to reduce the negative bias toward the elderly, 
probably by defusing the negative functions that transferred from the perspective of the 
elderly person to I, lends some support to RFT’s account of the relationship between 
perspective-taking and negative implicit bias toward the elderly. Indeed we argued previously 
that the precise and comprehensive nature of RFT concepts can account for the differential 
effects of perspective-taking interventions across different social groups. Recall that Todd et 
al. (2011, 2012) found that a perspective-taking intervention was associated with a positive 
bias towards a racial out-group. This begs the question, therefore, about how RFT can explain 
this effect in terms of the different biases between a racial out-group and an age-based 
outgroup? 
In the language of RFT, temporal relations are another critical feature of perspective-
taking, in that perspective-taking does not only involve the interpersonal relations of I and 
YOU. In short, temporal continuity is a strong feature of Iness. That is, I will be essentially 
the same person when I am old as I am now and as I was before (then) when I was even 
younger. As a result, age is a feature of temporal continuity that is just part of Iness. In this 
sense, I am aware now that at some time in the future (then) I will be old. As a result, while I 
am now coordinated with youth and distinct from the elderly, I will then be coordinated with 
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the elderly and distinct from youth. As a result, I will psychologically speaking, switch from 
one in-group to another in-group. If this is the case, I now is not fully distinct, nor opposite, 
to I then, thereby limiting the distinction relations between young and old. 
Let us now consider the very different scenario with perceived racial differences. 
Unlike the temporal continuity of Iness through which I will one day be old, I am unlikely in 
the future to switch racial groups. That is, for example, a white person is unlikely to become a 
black person and vice versa. In this case, there is no temporal continuity between white and 
black and other races participate in many relations of distinction, and even distinction, with 
Iness. Indeed, many IAT studies have recorded negative biases towards social out-groups.  
According to RFT, actively taking the perspective of a member of an out-group 
reduces some of the existing distinction and opposition relations, while enhancing 
coordination relations (e.g., I now see what it feels like to be victimized). Doing so could 
transfer both positive and negative functions. For example, I might feel greater empathy, or I 
might begin to feel shame at any previous experience in which I behaved in a racially biased 
way. Indeed, RFT would predict that both either or both types of function could transfer, 
depending on the individual and the context. If positive functions transferred from the racial 
other to I, negative bias would be reduced and may even be converted to a positive bias. 
However, as we observed with the elderly outgroup, the transfer of negative functions may 
become painful and aversive, thus permitting no reduction in negative bias. Only when an 
emotion-based intervention is added to enable me participants to deal with this painful 
emotional experience, can this negative bias be reduced. It is in these ways that RFT can 
account for the opposite effects for perspective-taking interventions on negative biases 
towards different outgroups.  
 As such, interpreting the current results using an RFT account allows for a more 
precise analysis of what processes actually may influence the emergent effects. The current 
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findings are also consistent with other recent conceptual developments in RFT, such as the 
flexible connectedness model (Vilardaga, Levin, & Hayes, 2014). According to this model, 
deictic relational responding (i.e., perspective-taking) and the transformation of empathic 
functions can lead to uncomfortable thoughts and feelings brought about by those relations 
and consequently lead to experiential avoidance, a process often linked to social 
stigmatization (e.g., Masuda et al., 2009) and psychological suffering (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, 
Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Increasing the contextual control over the transformation 
of stimulus functions of these deictic relations with the use of mindfulness and acceptance 
techniques can help to minimize these effects and lead to more flexible social connectedness. 
This model has been applied to different areas related to social behavior. For example, this 
model was used as a framework to understand the positive impact of empathy in human 
psychological suffering (Vilardaga, 2009), and the therapeutic relationship (Vilardaga & 
Hayes, 2011).  
One way to subject our suggestions above to empirical scrutiny would be to extend 
the current study with the inclusion of a behavioral approach task (BAT, see Leech, Barnes-
Holmes, & Madden, 2016), commonly used in conjunction with implicit measures. In short, 
one can only argue that mindfulness or other therapeutic interventions only work fully when 
aversive functions of the out-group are reduced, and appetitive functions increased, when an 
individual shows willingness to have close proximity, for example with a member of an 
outgroup. In the current context, one might ask whether participants in our P+M condition 
would be significantly more willing to assist an elderly person in need than participants in our 
P+cM condition. Behavioral approach tasks are a useful means of answering this important 
real-world question. 
As well as the suggestions for study extension, as noted above, we recognize a 
number of limitations in the current work. First, we can also refer to associations between the 
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intervention and the implicit biases. Without a pre-post experimental design including a 
baseline IAT measure, we cannot know if the intervention altered pre-existing biases.  
Second, we did not control for participants’ baseline propensity toward mindfulness, hence 
participants in the P+M condition may have had stronger pre-existing propensities toward 
mindfulness than participants, for example, in the condition cP+M. As a result, these pre-
experimental effects may have influenced current outcomes. Third, adherence is a notoriously 
difficult aspect to control in this type of analog research, and we did not include any checks 
on whether participants were actually following the instructions they received in the various 
conditions.    
In summary, the current work demonstrates two important points. First, the 
interpretation of these and previous findings using the concepts of RFT illustrates the 
potential relevance of the theory to the broader context of social psychology. The current 
extension of previous experimental work, especially the inclusion of the mindfulness 
intervention, also highlights the potential utility of RFT concepts in clinical and therapeutic 
contexts. Second, the study demonstrates the potential benefits of using mindfulness-based 
interventions in conjunction with perspective-taking in attempts to reduce negative social bias 
or prejudice. Future research and applications could explore whether methods such as those 
employed here could be used to reduce age-related stigma. 
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Table 1 
Mean and standard deviation scores of the D scores for all four conditions. 
 
Condition  Mean    SD  N 
 
cP+cM  0.52   0.33  21 
 
cP+M  0.49   0.39  22 
 
P+cM -0.63   0.35  32 
 
P+M -0.37   0.49  28 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
